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On July 24, 1971, Mr. and Mrs. Philip Myers drove from their
residence in California to a gambling and drinking establishment in
Nevada, known as Harrah's Club, where they stayed until the early
morning hours of July 25. During their stay, the Myers were served
numerous alcoholic beverages by Harrah's employees. After they
had left Nevada on their return trip and were traveling on a Cali-
fornia highway, their car, which was driven by Mrs. Myers, drifted
across the center line into the lane of oncoming traffic and collided
head-on with a motorcycle driven by Richard A. Bernhard, a resident
of California. As a result of the collision Bernhard suffered severe
injuries.
Bernhard brought actions against Mr. and Mrs. Myers, as well
as against Harrah's Club, in the Sacramento County Superior Court.
Mr. and Mrs. Myers failed to appear and did not become parties to
the subsequent appeals. Harrah's Club filed a general demurrer on
the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under
the common law of Nevada. The trial court sustained the demurrer
with leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal.
Bernhard appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Third
Division, which reversed the decision of the trial court. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court then granted Harrah's Club's petition for a
hearing. It reversed the decision of the trial court in a unanimous
opinion and remanded the case to that court with directions to over-
rule the demurrer and allow the defendant a reasonable time within
which to answer.'
* Reprinted by permission of C. H. Becksche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munich,
Germany.
** J.U.D., 1932, University of Heidelberg; LL.B., 1937, University of Washington
School of Law. Professor Emeritus, University of California, School of Law, Davis.
1. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 514 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215
(1976).
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The California Supreme Court took the position that California
law, which renders tavern keepers liable for torts committed by in-
toxicated patrons, rather than Nevada law, which does not provide
for such liability, was applicable to the case. The court derived the
applicable California rule of liability from two state statutes which
in conjunction, as the court had held in an earlier case, 2 were to be
construed as establishing a civil remedy for plaintiffs injured by in-
toxicated persons against the establishment which had caused their
intoxication.3 The court justified the application of this rule to a
Nevada establishment by the argument that California had a legiti-
mate governmental interest in protecting California domiciliaries by
this extension of the reach of the rule. Without attempting to make
any general pronouncement with respect to the extraterritorial scope
of state statutes and judge-made state rules the court concluded that
at least those out-of-state establishments which solicit the business
of Californians must bear the brunt of "dram shop" liability.
The court admitted that California's interest in protecting Cali-
fornia plaintiffs in personal injury suits against tavern keepers stood
in opposition to Nevada's interest in protecting Nevada defendants.
There was, to be sure, a Nevada criminal statute in effect at the time
of the relevant occurrences (though repealed in 1973), which pro-
hibited the sale of alcohol to "obviously" intoxicated persons. The
Nevada Supreme Court, however, had previously taken the unequiv-
ocal position that this statute did not impose any civil liability in
tort upon one in charge of a saloon or bar.4
In order to resolve the predicament of clashing state interests,
the California Supreme Court made use of a principle of recent Cal-
ifornia conflicts law called the "comparative impairment doctrine."
This doctrine requires a determination by the court in cases of this
type as to "which state's interest would be more impaired if its
policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state."5  This
2. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964) provides as follows: "Every
person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any
alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated
person is guilty of a misdemeanor." CAL. Evm. CODE § 669 (West Supp. 1977) estab-
lishes a presumption of tortious negligence if a person violates a statute or ordinance,
and if this violation proximately caused death or injury to persons or property.
4. Hamem v. Carson City Nugget, 85 Nev. 99, 459 P.2d 358 (1969).
5. 16 Cal. 3d at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr, at 219. On this doctrine
see Horowitz, "The Law of Choice of Law in California - A Restatement," 21 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 719, 748-58 (1974).
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approach does not, in the opinion of the court, involve a "weighing"
of opposing governmental interests in the sense of deciding which of
the conflicting state laws manifested the "better" or "worthier" so-
cial policy on the specific issue. The use of the doctrine, said the
court, called simply for the allocation of law-making domains in mul-
tistate contexts, that is, for the recognition of limitations on the reach
of state policies, as distinguished from an evaluation of the wisdom
of these policies.
Seen in this light, it was clear to the court that California's in-
terests would be seriously impaired by a refusal to apply the Cali-
fornia dram shop law to a Nevada establishment which had contrib-
uted to the causation of a California accident involving California
residents. California would be unable to effectuate its policy of pre-
venting the sale of alcohol to intoxicated persons if the California
rule would not also cover at least some categories of out-of-state
ern keepers.
It was just as obvious to the court that Nevada's interest would
not be significantly impaired by such extraterritorial application of
California law. "Since the act of selling alcoholic beverages to ob-
viously intoxicated persons is already proscribed in Nevada, the ap-
plication of California's rule of civil liability would not impose an
entirely new duty requiring the ability to distinguish between Cal-
ifornia residents and other patrons."6 Furthermore, Nevada had no
truly valid reason to complain "when, as in the instant case, liability
is imposed only on those tavern keepers who actively solicit Califor-
nia business."
7
A petition for a writ of certiorari was filed by Harrah's Club with
the United States Supreme Court in the summer of 1976. The peti-
tion alleged that the decision of the California court violated the full
faith and credit clause of article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution in a
twofold manner." First, it was argued that an ad hoc evaluation of
competing interests, as advocated in the challenged opinion, cannot
satisfy even the barest minimum of deference to which sister state law
is entitled, since it invariably or almost invariably leads to the result
of applying forum law. Secondly, the point was made that the court
violated full faith and credit in a more specific way by applying
6. Id. at 323, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
7. Id.
8. The relevant portion of art. IV, § 1 reads as follows: "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of
every other State."
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California tort rules in disregard of Nevada law dealing with the
legal liability of enterprises located within the boundaries of Nevada.9
The Supreme Court denied certiorari.9a
II.
The father of the governmental interest approach, which formed
the methodological basis of the decision of the California Supreme
Court in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, was Professor Brainerd Currie,
whose writings were cited and discussed with approval by the court.
He rejected the use of rules in the conflicts area and recommended
that the choice-of-law process should operate on an ad hoc basis.' 0
He declared that the central problem of conflict of laws was the con-
flict of state interests," a statement fraught with the implication
that the opposing interests of private litigants in such cases were of
a purely peripheral significance. Essential to an understanding of
Currie's theory is the realization that the governmental interests of
which he speaks do not represent governmental policies embodied
in choice-of-law rules but teleological considerations standing be-
hind the rules of substantive law that may compete for application.
One American court committed to Currie's methodology went so far
as to declare that a state's choice-of-law rules were to be completely
disregarded in determining that state's interest in the application of
its substantive law, even though in that case the choice-of-law rule
of the state concerned contained an outright disclaimer of interest
in such application.' 2
9. The brief for Harrah's Club was written by Professor Friedrich K. Juenger of
the University of California School of Law at Davis. It contains a sharp criticism of
the governmental analysis theory, chiefly on the ground that this theory is insensitive
to the needs for international and interstate comity. See also Juenger, Choice of Law
in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. BEv. 202, 206-07 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Juenger,
Interstate Torts].
9a. 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
10. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 180, 183, 627 (1963).
His statement that "the distinctive virtue of the common-law system is that it also
proceeds on an ad hoc basis," id. at 627, would appear to be unacceptable as a gener-
alized proposition.
11. Id. at 178.
12. Pfau v. Trent Aluminium Co., 55 N.J. 511, 526, 263 A.2d 129, 137 (1970).
The same view underlies Justice Traynor's reasoning in Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551,
432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). In both cases, the state declared by the courts
to have a significant interest in the application of their own law had a choice-of-law
rule which referred the disposition to the law of another state.
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Currie's theory is strongly forum-centered. If the forum has an
interest in enforcing its substantive law in a multistate context, it
should do so, regardless of whether another state also has an interest
in having its law applied. The earlier writings of Currie gave the
impression that any governmental interest of the forum was sufficient
for resort to local law. Because of a battery of criticisms which were
leveled against this position, Currie subsequently modified his views.
He stated that the forum should define its interest with restraint and
enlightenment. If the forum interest should be found to be slight
or insignificant as compared with the conflicting foreign interest, the
forum should declare that it was disinterested in applying its own
law.1
3
It is doubtful whether Currie would have approved of the com-
parative impairment doctrine used by the California Supreme Court
in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club. He took a strong position against en-
deavors by a forum court to engage in a balancing of conflicting
state interests, because he felt that judges were ill-equipped to un-
dertake such a task.14  The later revision of his thinking (which
Currie never spelled out in detail) need not be construed as an
abandonment of his anti-balancing stand, but merely as an admoni-
tion to the courts that they should not stretch parochial considera-
tions to the outer limits of their bounds but enforce local policy only
in the face of a substantial state interest.
The results produced by the California court's use of the com-
parative impairment doctrine do indeed lend some support to Currie's
doubts about the feasibility of a judicial weighing of clashing gov-
ernmental interests in conflicts cases. While the interests of Cali-
fornia, as viewed from a purely intrastate perspective, were defined
by the court quite convincingly, the corresponding analysis of Ne-
vada's governmental concerns leaves much to be desired. When
the court asserted that, because of the existence of a Nevada criminal
dram shop statute, "the application of California's rule of civil lia-
bility would not impose an entirely new duty," it ignored the fact
that the Nevada Supreme Court had explicitly rejected the imposi-
tion of civil liability because it "would subject the tavern owner to
ruinous expense every time he poured a drink and would multiply
litigation needlessly in a claim-conscious society."15 The California
Supreme Court also made no reference to the repeal of the Nevada
13. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 L. CoNTEMP. PaOB. 754, 757 (1963).
14. B. CumE, SELEcrE EssAYs ON TIM CONFLICT OF LAws 181-82 (1963).
15. Harm v. Carson City Nugget, 85 Nev. 99, 101, 450 P.2d 358, 359 (1969).
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criminal statute in 1973.15a The further statement by the California
court that extraterritorial application of California's dram shop law
was confined to Nevada taverns soliciting the business of Californians
can hardly be regarded as a genuine limitation of its extraterritorial
foray, since Nevada is a sparsely populated state and the gambling
and drinking establishments located in its only major cities, Reno
and Las Vegas, and in the border area at Lake Tahoe, depend heavily
on a California clientele for their survival.
III.
The use of governmental-interest methodology, in Currie's ver-
sion or in a modified form, is by no means restricted to the state of
California. A considerable number of American states - among
them Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Oregon, also
the District of Columbia - have abandoned the traditional approach
to conflicts laws embodied in the First Restatement of Conflicts and
moved towards some variety of interest analysis. 6 Until 1972, New
York belonged to this group of states. In that year, however, the
New York Court of Appeals handed down its decision in Neumeyer
v. Kuehner.'7 In that case, which involved the application of a
Canadian automobile guest statute in a wrongful death action brought
by a Canadian plaintiff against a New York defendant, the court ex-
pressed its disenchantment with governmental interest analysis and
the ad hoc case-by-case approach associated with it. Referring to
the fact that the earlier decisions of the court resting on this theory
had lacked consistency, the court explained that this defect
stemmed, in part, from the circumstance that it is frequently
difficult to discover the purpose or policies underlying the rele-
vant local law rules of the respective jurisdictions involved. It
is even more difficult, assuming that these purposes or policies
are found to conflict, to determine on some principled basis which
should be given effect at the expense of others.18
The court resolved the problem of the case by laying down
15a. Former NEv. STAT. § 202.100, repealed 1973 Nev. Stats. ch. 604, § 8, at 1062.
16. R. J. Weintraub, in 1971, counted 21 states reflecting this development. R. J.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY OF THE CoNFLIC'r OF LAws 239 (1971). See also R. C.
CRAMTON, D. P. CuRmRI & H.H. KAY, CoNrr OF LAws CAsEs-CoMMENTs-QUFs-
TIONs 247 (2d ed. 1975).
17. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d, 64, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972). A symposium on
this case is found in I HOFSma L. REv. 94 (1973).
18. 31 N.Y.2d at 127, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 69, 286 N.E.2d at 457 (Opinion by Fuld,
C. J.).
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three rules narrowly confined to the application of out-of-state guest
statutes, two of which were based on the traditional territorial princi-
ple, while the third one (dealing with the situation when passenger
and driver are domiciled in different states) still left room for some
degree of interest-weighing. 19
In an earlier New York decision, the present Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals, Charles Breitel, had decried, in a dis-
senting opinion, the "perverse parochialism" present in applying local
law to foreign transactions involving a forum resident.20  Another
criticism of the "new look" in American conflicts law came from a
federal district court in California which stated that
the law on "choice of law'" in the various states and in the fed-
eral courts is a veritable jungle which, if the law can be found
out, leads not to a "rule of action" but a reign of chaos.
2 1
There are many arguments which militate against the use of
governmental interest analysis. As several authors have pointed out,
the policy which a legal rule is designed to execute is seldom stated
at all or stated adequately.2 2  Furthermore, if there is any legisla-
tive or judicial history which sheds light on the social purpose of a
statute or rule, this purpose was most likely conceived and expressed
in terms of its domestic impact. When a bill is discussed in com-
mittee or in a legislative assembly, or if the objectives of a judge-
made rule are spelled out in a decision, the framers of the rule rarely
think of the potential effects of the rule upon cases with out-of-state
elements. It is even more hazardous to discern the policy consider-
ations underlying a foreign substantive rule calling for potential ap-
plication in a conflicts case. Thus, a perplexing and time-consuming
task is thrust upon the court which judges are normally unable to
handle adequately.
23
The burden upon the judge is aggravated if a particular law or,
rule of law has several purposes pointing towards the application of
different legal systems. It may also happen that a complex case
brings to the fore such a jumble of criss-crossing interests that a good
19. Id. at 457-58.
20. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 29, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 748, 237 N.E.2d 877,
887 (1968).
21. In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (D.C. Cal. 1975).
22. Kege, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 RECUEML ES Cours 91, 114 (1964);
Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 CoLmM. L. REv. 459, 464 (1967).
23. See Zweigert, Some Reflections on the Sociological Dimensions of Private Inter-
national Law, 44 U. CoLo. L. REv. 283, 299 (1973).
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legal magician will always be able to pull some preferred interest
out of a hat and proclaim it to be the dominant one.
24
It should also be taken into account that the Currie approach
leads to an encouragement of forum shopping which would be toler-
able only under the assumption (actually made by some lawyers and
writers in personal injury cases) that the plaintiff is always right.
Use of the theory will often satisfy the expectation of the plaintiff
to win his case, while it may easily disappoint the reasonable expec-
tations of a defendant unable to foresee the forum in which suit
would be brought.25  Last but not least, the theory fosters a state
chauvinism which seems strongly out of place in a world character-




A different approach to the solution of conflicts problems was
proposed by the Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second, which was
first published in several draft versions and then in its final form in
1971. One of its chief purposes was to remedy the dogmatic rigidity
which was believed to be the characteristic feature of the First Re-
statement, published in 1934. The fundamental policy principle
underlying the Restatement Second is the idea that the law of the
state which has the most significant relationship with the parties and
the transaction should be the governing law in conflicts cases. This
idea can be traced back to Savigny, who proposed that "for each
legal relationship that national law be ascertained to which this legal
relationship, according to its peculiar nature, belongs or is subject."T
The centering of focus in the conflicts area on the law of the
state with the closest relation to the facts would appear to be sup-
ported by commonsense and reason. Savigny did not, however, pro,
pose this basic rationale as a blanket standard for individualized law-
24. A good example is Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666,
114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974), where the analyst is at a loss in disentangling and ranking
the relevant interests, especially in the light of earlier California decisions.
25. The subordination, under Curries theory, of the private interests of the liti-
gants to the public law objectives of governments was pointed out by Kegel, The Crisis
of Conflict of Laws, 112 RECUEIL DES CoUns 91, 186, 207 (1964).
26. See in this connection the comments by F. A. Mann in his review of Currie's
book, 80 L. Q. REv. 589, 591 (1964).
27. See 8 F. C. VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTICEN RomiscHEN REcRTs 28 (1849)
(my translation).
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making by the courts. He sought to concretize the principle by a
multitude of specific rules designed to serve as general and obliga-
tory directives in the decision of conflicts cases.
The Restatement Second follows Savigny's approach only to a
limited extent. In the chief fields of the law, such as contracts, torts,
and property, it takes as its starting point the broad principle that
rights and liabilities with respect to a particular issue are determined
by the local law of the state which, as to that issue, has "the most
significant relationship" to the occurrence and the parties.28  A con-
siderable number of factors, to be discussed later, are to be taken
into account in making the relevant determination. In some in-
stances, this open-ended standard is to serve as the only guideline
for judicial action.29 In a greater number of instances, a specific
rule identifying the state whose law is to be applied is declared by
the Restatement to be determinative "unless, with respect to the par-
ticular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship ...
to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of
the other state will be applied."30 In a third category of cases, the
general "significant rilationship" principle is enunciated in the first
paragraph of a section, followed by a statement in a second para-
graph which sets forth the choice of law the courts will "usually"
make in the given situation.31 The Second Restatement also contains
some hard-and-fast rules which apparently are not subject to excep-
tions; the large majority of these rules are found in the areas of prop-
erty and administration of estates.
A not insubstantial number of courts have adopted the approach
of the Second Restatement.32  In studying recent judicial develop-
ments one gains the impression, however, that the methodology of
the Restatement has taken second place, behind governmental in-
28. See, e.g., B ATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CoNmFLCT or LAws §§ 145, 188, 222
(1971).
29. E.g., §§ 167 (survival of actions), 168 (charitable immunity), 171 (measure
of damages in tort actions), 173 (contribution among tortfeasors), 174 (vicarious lia-
bility), 207 (measure of recovery for breach of contract), 221 (restitution).
30. E.g., §§ 146 (personal injury cases), 147 (injury to real and personal prop-
erty), 149 (defamation), 155 (malicious prosecution), 175 (wrongful death), 189 &
191 (contracts for the transfer of interests in land and chattels), 192-193 (insurance
contracts), 196 (contracts for services).
31. E.g., §§ 157 (standard of care in torts cases), 159 (duty owed in torts cases),
160 (proximate cause), 164 (contributory fault), 198 (capacity to contract), 199 (for-
malities), 202 (illegality).
32. The relevant decisions are listed in B. C. Cn iroN, D. P. CmUn & H. H. KAY,
CoNrucr OF LAws: CAsEs-Co.mws-QuEsnoNs 310-12 (2d ed. 1975).
terest analysis, in capturing the allegiance of the judiciary in the
United States. One possible reason for this fact is the greater ap-
peal of simplicity emanating from Currie's theory, with its almost
invariable recourse to the law with which the judge is most familiar.
In contrast thereto, the balancing of factors incumbent on the judge
under Restatement Second in determining the jurisdiction with the
most significant relationship to the parties and occurrence is a task
fraught with many difficulties. These factors include the needs of
the interstate and international systems; the relevant policies of the
forum; the policies of other interested states; the protection of justi-
fied expectations; the basic principles underlying the particular field
of the law; certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and
ease in the determination of the law to be applied.33
These criteria are numerous and potentially conflicting. To de-
cide which of these variables should finally tip the balance in the out-
come imposes an arduous burden on the judge, and an even greater
onus on the lawyer attempting to predict the result of a comparative
judicial evaluation as mandated by the Restatement. 34  As F. A.
Mann has pointed out, "in the vast majority of cases the question is
one of grade, shade, nuance, of fine distinction and neat balancing,
on which different minds may reach different conclusions." 35
V.
There is another way of dealing with conflicts problems, or at
least some conflicts problems, which has made its appearance on the
American scene and is usually referred to as the "better law" ap-
proach. It has been proposed in a restricted as well as a broad ver-
sion and has received endorsement, in an open or disguised form, by
some American courts.
Robert Leflar may be considered the chief protagonist of a re-
stricted "better law" approach.36 To him, selection of the more sat-
isfactory law by the judge in a conflicts case constitutes one of five
choice-influencing considerations. The other four items on his list
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
34. See the critical comments by Cavers, Restating the Conflict of Laws - Con-
tracts, XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW (K. H. Nadelmann et al.
ed. 1961), p. 355. See also Von Mehren, "Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Method-
ology," 60 CORNELL L. Q. 927, at 964 (1975).
35. Mann, The Proper Law of Contract, 3 INT'L L. Q. 60, 69 (1950).
36. R. A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLxCTs LAW (rev. ed. 1968), ch. 11, especially
254-259.
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are (a) predictability of results, (b) maintenance of interstate and
international order, (c) simplification of the judicial task, and (d)
advancement of the forum's governmental interests. In many cases,
he argues, one of these four factors, or a combination of them, will
clearly turn the scales in favor of a certain solution, but if their rele-
vance or respective weight are doubtful, the judge should select the
best substantive rule offering itself in a comparison of the laws of
the conflicting jurisdictions.
Friedrich Juenger has proposed to invest the judge with a more
broadly-defined discretion in making a choice between available sub-
stantive rules on the basis of superior fairness or justice.3 7  He re-
jects the idea that international private law requires for its realiza-
tion a form of justice sui generis which aims at the identification of
a proper territorial system of law controlling the solution.38 This
viewpoint, he maintains, refuses to provide any guarantee for the
accomplishment of an adequate result on the merits.3 9 Evidently
assuming that fundamental conceptions of justice, insofar as they re-
late to the disposition of international or multistate problems, do not
differ too widely in the civilized world, he expresses the hope that
use of the "better law" approach will in a gradual process of devel-
opment lead to the creation of a universal law, similar in character
to the ancient Roman jus gentium or the more recent international
maritime law. As a device for limiting the number of legal systems
from which a choice of the controlling substantive rule may be made
by the court, Professor Juenger advocates the use of traditional con-
flicts criteria, such at nationality, domicile, situs, lex loci delicti, etc.
40
The "better law" theory, in one version or another, has found
the approval of some American courts. In Clark v. Clark,41 a hus-
band and wife left their home in New Hampshire to drive to another
part of the same state for a visit. Part of their trip took them to
Vermont, where an accident occurred. The wife brought action in
New Hampshire against her husband. New Hampshire had no guest
statute, and Vermont did have such a statute. The Supreme Court
of New Hampshire adopted Professor Leflar's five choice-influencing
37. F. K. JuENGEn, Zum WADmEL DES INTEmATiONA EN PmvATnECHTs (1974)
[hereinafter cited as JuENcEn, PrvATmCHTs]; Juenger, Interstate Torts, supra note 9, at
222-35.
38. See the arguments of G. KEcEL, INTERNAnoNAiS PirVATnECHT (2d ed. 1971)
42-44 in favor of recognizing a special conflicts justice.
39. Juenger, PiuvATmEGHTs, supra note 37, at 9, 11-14.
40. Id. at 25-29.
41. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
considerations but placed the chief emphasis on the superiority of the
forum law, which was unburdened by a guest statute.
We prefer to apply the better rule of law in conflicts cases just
as is done in nonconflicts cases, when the choice is open to us.
If the law of some other state is outmoded, an unrepealed rem-
nant of a bygone age, a "drag on the coattails of civilization"
• . . . we will try to see our way clear to apply our own law in-
stead. If it is our own law that is obsolete or senseless (and
it could be) we will try to apply the other state's law.42
In situations where the state of the accident - which was at the
same time the forum state - had no guest statute, whereas the domi-
ciliary state of the parties did have such a statute, the Supreme
Courts of Wisconsin and Minnesota also used forum law because of
its superior merits.43  For the same reason, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi applied its local comparative negligence statute in a case
in which two Mississippi residents were killed in an automobile ac-
cident occurring in Louisiana. 44  A number of decisions can also be
found in which the application of a prima facie applicable orthodox
conflicts rule was evaded by the use of escape devices, such as doubt-
ful characterizations or result-oriented interpretations of the renvoi
doctrine, for the purpose of applying a substantive rule reflecting the
forum's conceptions of justice.
4
5
One potential advantage of the "better law" approach over gov-
ernmental interest analysis consists in the fact that the former ap-
proach, at least in theory, is not encumbered by the parochialism and
state-chauvinism which is normally a concomitant of the latter. It
is to be noted, however, that in the large majority of the cases dis-
cussed or cited in the preceding paragraph, the courts actually ap-
plied the legal rule of the forum.46 As a federal court has observed,
a judge may with respect to statutory law be obligated to enforce
the local law as the better law, upon the consideration that the legis-
lature of his state has given preference to it over alternative solu-
tions.
47
42. Id. at 355, 222 A.2d at 209.
43. Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968); Milkovitch v.
Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
44. Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968).
45. See the cases reproduced in W. L. M. REESE & M. RoSE.NBERa, CONFLICT OF
LAws: CASES AND MATERIALS, 494-510 (6th ed. 1971).
46. In Zellinger v. State Sand and Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 113, 156 N.W.2d
466, 473 (1968), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated by way of dictum that "we
would apply the law of a nonforum state if it were the better law." See also Clark
v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
47. Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533, 537 (D.C. Wis. 1968).
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According to Professor Juenger, it is also one of the advantages
of the "better law" rule that
it does not involve the hazards of uncertainty and lack of pre-
dictability inherent in current methodology. A court adopting
it would not purport to administer justice ad hoc, but would
have to state the reasons why one tort rule is preferable to
another.4 1
Since, however, the determination as to the superiority of a par
ticular rule is not to be made in a general and abstract fashion but
in the context of an international or multistate problem,49 the impact
of such a rule upon a fair solution may differ considerably depend-
ing upon the nature of the problem presented in a particular case.
Professor Juenger's reliance on the stare decisis effect of a decision
passing on the soundness of a certain rule"o might not always be a
sufficient counterweight to the danger of ad hoc decisions, since a
substantial difference in the facts might justify disregard of the doc-
trine of stare decisis.
Professor Juenger's hope for a universal law which does not se-
lect jurisdictions but reasonable rules of substantive law in the dis-
position of conflicts cases depends for its realization on a growing
consensus among the judges of the world community that certain
legal solutions are intrinsically preferable to others. One might har-
bor legitimate doubts whether such a novel jus gentium could be
fashioned within a reasonable period of time. The creation of an
international maritime law, which began in the late Middle Ages,
was probably an easier task because it was confined to one special
field in which the similarity of commercial customs of seafaring na-
tions contributed greatly to the feasibility of unification. To achieve
a similar uniformity in all fields of law which may become relevant
in the decision of conflicts cases, including the impact of nationali-
zations and the effect of the operations of multistate corporations,
would indeed amount to a miracle in a polarized world, unless an
early convergence of clashing economic philosophies was deemed
to be within the range of possibility. Even on a regional basis, the
48. Juenger, Interstate Torts, supra note 3, at 232. He goes on to say: "It is
difficult to conceive of a bench composed of guest statute enthusiasts, devotees of limited
wrongful death recovery, or intrafamily immunity aficionados." One could imagine
that some judges might favor limited recovery in malpractice cases or in states where
excessive jury verdicts are common.
49. No American judge would wish to make a declaration of injustice with respect
to a French rule, as far as its domestic effects in France are concerned, and this is
admitted by Professor Juenger in JUENGER, PRXVATRECHTs, supra note 37, at 29.
50. Juenger, Interstate Torts, supra note 9, at 233.
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prospects for achieving harmonization of legal norms are not en-
couraging at this time.
The foregoing comments should not be construed as importing
complete rejection of the "better law" theory. This theory underlies,
in a certain sense, the ordre public doctrine which appears to form
part of the international private law of all nations. When the public
policy exception to the application of foreign law is used by a court,
a determination is made to the effect that a foreign substantive rule
is not in harmony with the forum's basic conceptions of justice.
When, in such a case, the court does not dismiss the case but sub-
stitutes a rule of domestic law for the foreign rule, 51 it does in effect
put the "better law" philosophy into practice.
On the other hand, as Professor Juenger has pointed out, pub-
lic policy does not provide a handle for the avoidance of undesirable
forum law.52  When the judge is not bound by a definite rule of
conflicts law to apply the law of his state but has discretion in the
matter, situations may arise where the judge may properly conclude
that the application of foreign law would result in greater justice to
the parties. For example, when the local law would invalidate a
transaction, while at least one of the parties, in the absence of fore-
sight of the forum, could reasonably have expected validation, the
judge may under certain circumstances be justified in applying an
appropriate foreign law which recognizes the legality of the trans-
action.
VI.
In the view of Professor Rheinstein, "American conflicts law has
... been led into a dead alley."5 3 It there a way out of the impasse
which does not require a return to the place of original departure?
The chief cause of the unsuccessful journey performed by an
American conflicts law in recent times was the stagnation produced
by an earlier judicial acceptance of the doctrinaire methodology
enunciated in the First Restatement of Conflicts. This work was
strongly influenced by the philosophy of Joseph H. Beale and pro-
51. An example is Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133,
172 N.E.2d 526 (1961). Application of domestic law should be the general rule in
cases where foreign law is rejected on public policy grounds, unless justified expecta-
tions of a party would be disappointed by such an application.
52. Juenger, Interstate Torts, supra note 9, at 229.
53. Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrift, 11 AM. J. Com. LAw 632, 633
(1962).
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mulgated by the American Law Institute in 1934. The methodology
of the Restatement postulated, as a general principle, the strict en-
forcement of rights which had become vested under a territorial
regime of law. Adherence to the dogmatic propositions deduced
from this principle by American courts led to disappointments which
resulted, first, in the use of conceptual escape devices to avoid unjust
decisions and, later, in the rise of new and highly flexible conflicts
ideologies which, in Professor Prosser's language, pushed the courts
into a "quagmire."5 4  Is it possible to find a solution to the problem
which proceeds from the basic assumption that certainty and elas-
ticity in legal methodology are not polar opposites, between which
a clearcut choice must be made, but complementary values, which
in some fashion must be meshed together?55
A new approach which points in this direction has been proposed
by Professor David Cavers. He advocates adoption of "rules of pref-
erence" which are designed to yield articulated criteria for choice-
of-law decisions based on a qualitative evaluation of competing sub-
stantive rules of law. These criteria do not look to governmental
interests, party expectations, or forum law preference as governing
factors. In the field of tort liability, they make the choice dependent
primarily on which of the states connected with the parties or tortious
occurrence sets a higher standard of conduct or financial protection.56
Some of these principles mark a return to the territorial concept,
others have a personal-law cast. Professor Cavers has also proposed
a few rules of preference in the field of contracts and conveyances,
which are characterized by a considerable degree of complexity.Y7
All of these rules are viewed by Cavers "only as guides for decision,
leaving ample room for independent judgment to any courts that
resorted to them."58
Cavers finds himself in agreement with Currie in seeing "the
choice-of-law problem as posed by the need to choose between two
specific rules of law, not between the legal systems of two jurisdic-
tions."59 This method is subject to the criticism that it forces the
judge, on a wide scale, into a qualitative evaluation of rules and
54. W. L. Paossim, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAw OF TORTS 89 (1953).
55. Otto Kahn-Freund agrees that this should be the guiding rationale in conflicts
methodology. See his General Problems of Private International Law, 143 REcuRiL
DES CouRs 139, 468 (1974).
56. D. F. CAvEns, Thm CHoicE oF LAw PROCESS 139-180 (1965).
57. Id. at 181-203.
58. Id. at 136. See also Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Per-
spective, 131 REcurmL DFS Cours 75, 151-158 (1970).
59. D. F. CAVwmS, TBE CHoiCE OF LAw PocEsS 72 (1965).
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principles as a prerequisite for choosing an appropriate legal system.
This may in many cases impose an arduous burden on the judge. To
decide, for example, whether a certain legal system sets a "higher"
or "lower" standard of liability than another system may require a
thorough study of the position of the conflicting rules within the
totality of the system to which they belong, the relation of these
rules to other rules which may qualify or condition them, and an
analysis of the decisional law which illustrates the actual operation
and effect of these rules. It also needs to be noted that the rules of
preference thus far proposed by Professor Cavers cover only a small
variety of the issues that may require determination in a conflicts
case.
Those who believe that our already overburdened judges should
not be saddled with responsibilities which call for an extraordinary
degree of sophistication and subjective valuation will be strongly
inclined to advocate a return to the time-honored method of state-
selection by choice-of-law rules, in preference to the method of rule-
selection through a result-oriented comparison of norms. Inasmuch
as there exists a stock of fixed rules in all substantive and procedural
areas of developed national legal systems, it might be asked why
a field as complex and potentially amorphous as private international
law should dispense with the requirement of rules facilitating the
discharge of the judicial function6 0
The process of legislation would appear to be the most feasible
way of providing at least a basic core of rules designed to identify
the legal system which, in the opinion of the legislator, bears the
closest relationship to the parties and issues. In cases where it is
very difficult to make this determination, some way must be found
to cut the Gordian knot; in the area of contracts, for example, it may
become necessary to adopt different solutions for different kinds of
contracts. In a federal state such as the United States, Congression-
al legislation would be the most serviceable device for imparting a
reasonable measure of certainty and uniformity to conflicts law; the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, in conjunc-
tion with the commerce clause, would probably be held by the courts
to bestow constitutional legality upon such an undertaking. In the
international field, treaties and conventions adopted by a large num-
ber of states would be the most appropriate instrumentality for
achieving the same objective.
60. See Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315
(1972), in agreement with this basic position.
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The affirmation of the need for choice-of-law rules does by no
means entail an abandonment by the judges of every trace of control
over the content of the substantive law whose application is man-
dated by a choice-of-law rule. The public policy exception, for ex-
ample, is designed to supply a handle to the judge for the non-
application of law deemed highly objectionable by the forum. For
several reasons, however, it affords an insufficient protection against
the commission of serious injustices. First, American courts have
sometimes dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction if the plaintiff
relies on a foreign rule held unacceptable by the court, leaving the
plaintiff at large to pursue his remedy in a different and potentially
inconvenient, unavailable, or hostile forum.61 Secondly, while Amer-
ican courts have used public policy in some cases to defeat the ap-
plication of undesirable sister state law, the act-of-state doctrine
promulgated by the United States Supreme Court has placed almost
unsurmountable obstacles in the path of rejecting foreign law con-
sidered incompatible with the forum's fundamental conceptions of
justice. 2 Thirdly, as was mentioned earlier, reliance on ordre public
is not possible when it is forum law, rather than foreign law, which
produces an inadequate result in a conflicts case.63
When public policy is unavailable as a choice-influencing cri-
terion, the time-honored Aristotelian doctrine of equity might be
used as a safety valve against the danger of serious injustice in con-
flicts cases. The doctrine has its roots in the widely-noted fact that
a general statement contained in a rule may in some instances pro-
duce consequences which the rule-maker had not, or could not have,
foreseen. If, in such a case, it can be firmly assumed that he would
have created an exception from the rule, a judicial correction of the
rule is deemed to be warranted. Aristotle believed, however, that
this equitable power should be confined to cases where a special dis-
pensation becomes imperative rather than merely desirable.64
In its bearing on the subject of conflicts, use of this doctrine
would authorize judicial departures from choice-of-law rules, as well
61. For citations of cases see R. A. LEuL.An, AmmcAc CoNmucrrs LAw 105 n.2
(rev. ed. 1968). The notion that a court applying the public policy exception should
decline jurisdiction was suggested by way of dictum and in a situation where there were
special reasons for the suggestion, by Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,
224 N.Y. 99, 107, 120 N.E. 198, 200 (1918).
62. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). For a criticism of this position see Mann, The
Legal Consequences of Sabbatino, in STuiEs iN INTERNATIONAL LAw 484-89 (1973)
63. See Juenger, Interstate Torts, supra note 9, at 229.
64. 5 AmsToTLE, ThE NicoamrcAs Eamcs (Loeb Classical Lib. ed., 1947).
as substantive rules of a national legal system, in those situations in
which application of the rule would clearly, unmistakably, and per-
vasively frustrate or subvert the purpose for which the rule was
adopted. A recent California case provides an example.6 5 Two
permanent California residents, who were first cousins, became mar-
ried in Nevada. Unknown to them, a Nevada statute prohibited the
marriage of first cousins. After the ceremony, the couple continued
to live in California. When the husband died, the wife filed a peti-
tion to determine heirship. An appellate court in California ad-
judged the marriage invalid, although California permits the mar-
riage of first cousins. The court held that the wife could not in-
herit according to the rules applicable to legally married persons.
The decision was based on a rigid interpretation of a California
choice-of-law rule providing that the law of the place of marriage
controls the validity of the marriage. If, however, the purpose of
the Nevada statute prohibiting first-cousin marriages is taken into
account, it is clear that the enactment was not designed to regulate
the domestic relations of transients who lived permanently in a state
which recognized the validity of first cousin marriages. Although
the Nevada statute was applicable to the case in its literal formula-
tion, the court should have allowed an equitable exception under
these circumstances.
Equitable departures from fixed rules may also be helpful in
solving some problems of renvoi. Many jurisrictions, within the
American commonwealth and elsewhere in the world, reject the doc-
trine of renvoi. The courts in these jurisdictions hold that a forum
rule referring the disposition of a case to a foreign legal system should
be enforced, regardless of whether the foreign system throws the
disposition back to the law of the forum. There may be instances,
however, in which the application of substantive foreign law would
gravely disappoint the legitimate expectations of a party or other-
wise produce an extreme inequity. In the case of refugees, for ex-
ample, application of the law of their former home country might in-
flict serious damage or deprivation to them, and the public policy
exception might not be available to a court desiring to redress the
potential wrong.
The judicial power to adopt equitable exceptions from fixed rules
in unusual situations should extend to those rules of substantive law,
domestic or foreign, which govern the decision of a case according
65. In re Estate of Levie, 50 Cal. App. 3d 572, 123 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1975).
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to the pertinent conflicts rule. In situations where this substantive
norm is a foreign rule, the authority to dispense equity should not
be construed as a delegation of power to the judge for revising the
domestic (Le., internal) law of a foreign country. The range of the
equitable exception should be limited to the operation of the rule in
a multistate or international context.
The objection might be made that the acceptance of these rec-
ommendations would defeat the goal of legal certainty which the
advocacy of a conflicts jurisprudence based on rules was designed to
promote in the first place. Is it not likely that judges would make
a copious use of their equitable discretion in order to achieve the
result reflecting their subjective conception of justice?
The answer must be that, in order to obviate this danger, the
highest courts of the states would have to exercise a tight control over
rule departures by lower-court judges. Unless a court comes to the
copclusion that the reason underlying a certain rule cannot possibly
support its enforcement in an individual case, the court should apply
the rule, even though the ensuing result might be questionable from
the point of view of justice. Differently expressed, equitable dis-
cretion should be confined to cases in which the policy behind the
rule would be negated or destroyed, rather than merely impeded or
weakened, by a strict enforcement of the rule.
Paul Heinrich Neuhaus, in a highly suggestive article, has said
that "in some places, there already appears again a reversion (or,
rather, a new progress) towards a novel kind of legal certainty." 6
He expresses the conviction that the search for legal certainty is an
essential function of the law as such and therefore cannot be sup-
pressed for any length of time. But Neuhaus does not believe that
legal certainty should be bought at the price of a complete disregard
of fundamental justice. "Between the extremes of general rules and
the lack of any rules, there is a middle way."
67
The suggested compromise need not necessarily be one between
rule-adherence and a wholly individualized equity. Since few fact
situations are wholly unique, the recognition of an equitable excep-
tion in a particular case will frequently evolve into a new, more dif-
ferentiated, rule which might serve as a precedent in like or highly
similar situations or lend itself to subsequent codification.
66. Neuhaus, Legal Certainty versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 28 L. & CoN-
TE I,. PROB. 795, 802 (1963).
67. Id. at 804.
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There is another consideration lending support to a synthesis
between structured order and a modicum of open-ended justice.
We know today that insistence on literal execution of formulated
rules has not provided us with the security of legal expectation which
at one time was believed to be gained by the adoption of a mechan-
ical jurisprudence. It is generally agreed today that words are in-
exact symbols of communication, since they are frequently amenable
to a broad or narrow construction. The recognition of equitable
powers in the courts would seem to be a more honest way of over-
coming the deficiences inherent in general pronouncements than the
manipulation of words or their stretching to the utmost end of their
semantic bounds. In addition to being the more honest method, the
proposed synthesis would at the same time be an expression of the
lasting truth that stability in law cannot always be the last word of
wisdom in an inconstant world, whose fluctuations and vicissitudes
will inevitably bring forth some unforeseeable contingencies. But
it must be emphasized again that deviation from norms should re-
main limited to the abnormal situation, and that the conception of
law as a network of rules should be the primary guidepost for a re-
orientation in American conflicts law.
(Vol. 29
